1913: The Eve of War

This cracking little book, by the historian Paul Ham, looks at one of the most complex subjects in history, the causes of the First World War. Short, sharp and provocative I found it to be an especially interesting and timely read during the final days of 2013, a century on from the events it considers. Ham has little time for those, like Christopher Clark, who argue that Europe's leaders were Sleepwalkers who drifted into war by accident and describes the idea that the First World War was some kind of careless mistake as "nonsense". Nor does he particularly agree with the likes of Max Hastings that the Catastrophe of the Great War was a necessary reaction to the proto-fascist aggression of the Kaiser's Germany. Rather, Ham believes that the Great Powers planned for the war for years and years beforehand and that their plans were so precise and so detailed that they became, in effect, self-fulfilling prophecies. By the time the carnage was unleashed the politicians and generals were caught up in events they could no longer control as years of pent-up rivalry and mistrust were unleashed. As a concise re-examination of the origins of the First World War, I doubt this book could be bettered. In fact, as a short introduction to the subject [it runs to the equivalent of 80-odd printed pages] I'd even recommend it over Niall Feguson's 1914 : Why the World Went to War , despite the fact that Ham actually quotes from Ferguson's The Pity of War , from which that book is extracted, throughout this essay. I also hope to read more from Ham soon as it appears this Kindle Single is actually just a prologue to his forthcoming, full-size work on the outbreak of World War One which is available now on audio download and released in May next year in hardback and on Kindle: 1914: The Year The World Ended .

A very concise yet well written view of the year before the Great War started. As an easily readable overview of the conditions, thoughts, factors and events that came before the war this is a very good book indeed. It has pace and clarity and succeeds in communicating key themes and stimulating further more detailed reading for those who now want to go into more depth on the causes of the Great War. Historians are still debating those causes and this is an excellent hook upon which to continue that debate

This essay would make a good starting point for someone curious about the causes of the First World War. It sets out to challenge what it sees as the traditional view that the 'Great Powers' stumbled into the conflict. Ham's basic argument is that well before 1914 senior politicians in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France and to a lesser degree Britain saw a major European war as inevitable and in some cases desirable. Military leaders are portrayed as hoping, sometimes craving for war whilst war planning took place on a colossal scale, was immensely detailed and hugely resourced: The mainland European powers all had standing armies of hundreds of thousands of men with conscription embedded in society. All had 'mobilization' plans designed to get their armies to their borders in rapid time. Set against this Ham states (rather than argues) that the general populations lived in splendid ignorance of the inevitability of war that their politicians saw so clearly. Ham's essay has pace, holds the attention and provides much food for thought yet seems rushed and over anxious to make it's point . It supports its main thesis with telling quotations from many of the key players but at other times sweeps through important statements without describing the supporting evidence. It's biggest defect in this regard is the lack of evidence or argument, although there is some description in the first chapter, to support his view that the general populations were ignorant of the planning and desire for war. There is no analysis of how he thinks this came to be in spite of, for example, the pervasiveness of conscription across Europe, the knowledge and at times almost hysterical support for the Dreadnought arms race in Britain and Germany (and for that matter Turkey where the money for two Dreadnoughts was in part raised by public subscription). In Britain a popular cry went up, 'We want eight (more Dreadnoughts) and we won't wait!'. A strength is the section on 'mobilization' which gives a good understanding of what this entailed including its huge scale, the years of planning which it required, why it was so important and why once started hostilities were virtually inevitable. As an example of the preparations politicians and military leaders made years before the outbreak of war Ham refers to the minute detail involved in the development of railway mobilization timetables designed to deliver huge numbers of troops to the border quickly and in good order. He might too have mentioned the small border villages which boasted railway stations with platforms half a mile long. The essay is worth the read and excellent value but I would treat it as a starter which opens up the subject rather than a definitive analysis of it. Perhaps it needs a full book to do that.

As I've mentioned in other reviews, I find the immediate pre-WWI years to be very interesting, and this short and easy to read book certainly held my attention. It goes further than looking merely at the geo-political issues, such as military build-ups and "what we need is a good war" (a sentiment denied by various people after four years of appalling carnage). These, of course, are fully addressed but other not unrelated aspects are also examined. For example, the growth of the railways played a pivotal part in the lead up to the War, as did on-going friction in the Balkans. There had also been five decades of rapid mechanisation; a considerable amount of newly acquired wealth; but also poverty and labour unrest. Also in Britain there was substantial anti-German feeling, in spite of having what was in effect a German Royal Family. I'm not sure that this book says anything new, but it does give a rational and sober analysis of the build up to a catastrophe. Incidentally, I came across some interesting words in Mr Ham's book, such as solipsistic, recrudescent and sclerotic.

Ham questions the orthodoxy that the war was inevitable, but concludes that it was because those in power determined that it was so. Europe was divided into armed camps and there were complex alliances that ensured a domino effect once one nation entered into conflict with another, but these armed camps were the product of deep mistrust. War plans became so advanced and meticulous that war became virtually inevitable - the plans became self-fulfilling. Furthermore, many of the leaders felt there was a need for war to ensure their country achieved their ambitions or took their rightful place at the top table. Take Germany, for example. Germany had been late into the colonial race and by the time it had entered the world had been carved up, largely by the British, French and Russians. Although Germany was the most powerful emerging economy, there was no place for it on the world stage. Thus, expansion in Europe was the only way to fulfill its ambitions. Couple that with fear that Russia would soon become the dominant world power if it wasn’t cut down to size, and France would inevitably rekindle its old rivalry because of the loss of Alsace Lorraine, Germany’s only recourse was to fight on both fronts, and a quick defeat of France was necessary to enable it to turn its attention to Russia in the east. And then there was the social climate of the time. The much cited Belle Epoque was a middle and upper class phenomenon. Ordinary working people were fervently patriotic and, persuaded by a partial press, were willing to die gloriously for their country. The youth of Europe was in rebellion against their cynical elders, and the war machine was fed by the fodder of millions of young men eager for the glories of war. The world of 1913 was a dangerous place. There had been the naval arms race between Britain and Germany which ensured that both had immensely powerful navies. That Germany lost this race led them to ensure they had the most powerful army, and they conscripted hundreds of thousands of young men to balance the massive armies of Russia. The building of European railways also contributed. To move millions of men there had to be an efficient railway system and Germany, France and Russia were engaged in a race to finish theirs first. Mobilisation was the key. If you didn’t mobilise your troops as quickly as the enemy you would be defeated. Once the tracks were laid and the timetables drawn up, it was inevitable they would be used. But perhaps the greatest driver for war was a negative one. All the leading politicians believed a war was inevitable, and none took any serious steps to prevent it. Of course, they did not envisage the world conflagration that eventually ensued, but it was a fault of leadership that ensured the conflict would happen. Ham puts it succinctly: ‘Sheer laziness, unintelligence and inability to concentrate were commonplace.’ He talks of an ‘awful silence at the top table. Nobody proposed a summit to discuss the growing crisis….Politicians never seriously tried to control their generals.’ He concludes: ‘The simple truth is: men in power planned, chose – or weakly acquiesced in the choice – to go to war, only they could have avoided or stopped it…..They were all, more or less, responsible.’ He is aware that he is writing with hindsight, but the lack of foresight of the world’s leaders is startling in view of the 37 million people who lost their lives in a conflict that, in Ham’s view, could have been avoided. A fine essay distilling a powerful argument about a conflict that changed human society for ever.

This is now the second time I have read this book and have thoroughly enjoyed 're-acquainting myself of the details,political and military thinking. Of that time. Paul Ham presents us with a very clear analysis of events. Really worthwhile reading again about those momentous times. Now I Must turn my attention to 1914'

Paul Ham has with great explained the backround of how this catastrophic part of History figures in great clear language. An excellent read for those without detailed knowledge to be aware of the great mishandling of avoidable of difficulty situations of political situations that caused loss of live and misery for ordinary citizens. A great informative read.

I know what I disliked most about this book. It wasn't the tired Marxist analysis which viewed the events leading up to WW1 through the prism of class struggle and the assumption that class, trumping all other considerations, was the prime mover in causing the war, in that the author seemed to be suggesting that the kings and autocrats of pre-War Europe conspired, if unconsciously, to stop the inevitable triumph of the proletariat and left-liberal ideals by diverting their energies into war. It wasn't the author's Schroedinger's Cat portrayal of Germany both as the meek, mild victim of Anglo-Russo-French malice and 'Germanophobia', yet as a nation full of rabidly nationalist Prussian generals, social Darwinists and other racists as hellbent on war as the other Great Powers; Germany changed from page to page in order to underline whatever point he was making at the time. It wasn't the page after page of socialist ranting (screeds of it, unbroken by references) casting snide asides at the upper classes and the leaders of the time and, when they didn't perform as he - or the socialist dialectic - demanded, the lower orders. It wasn't even the pompous epilogue in which he castigates "bad" historians for viewing history using hindsight as an analysis tool - something which he had done throughout and indeed, without which, history is just so much story-telling. My principal beefs with this book manifested themselves within the first few pages. First was Ham's promise to cut through the "misinformation, propaganda and outright lies", immortal words which I normally associate with conspiracy theories rather than proper academic works. Second was presence of factual errors which may be blamed either on Ham or his proofers. To describe the pre-War King George V as "King of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland" demonstrates an ignorance of the fact that Ireland was not partitioned until after the Great War ended. The second was Ham's repeated identification of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a member of the Balkan alliance which fought the wars in 1912-3. In fact, the country he means is Montenegro. Simple factual errors like that do not inspire confidence in the rest of the book, which contained some interesting facts relating to mobilisation and the attitudes of German leaders, the veracity of which I do not feel comfortable in accepting without reading other works, which defeats the object of buying this book.